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JUVENILE CURFEWS: PROTECTION OR REGULATION?
Curfews' have often been imposed on individuals in the United
States2 and in other countries.' They have been imposed in emergency
situations,4 in times of war,5 and on the basis of race,6 gender,7 and age.'
Curfews pose a controversial issue on which parents, children, lawmakers,
and legislators have conflicting viewpoints. Within each group, there is
'A curfew is defined as, "A law (commonly an ordinance) which imposes on people
(particularly children) the obligation to remove themselves from the streets on or before a certain
time of night." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 381 (6th ed. 1990).
2 See, e.g., Hutchins v. District of Columbia, 942 F. Supp. 665 (D.D.C. 1996);
Ashton v. Brown, 660 A.2d 447 (Md. 1995); Qutb v. Strauss, 11 F.3d 488 (5th Cir. 1993).
'See Thistlewood v. Trial Magistrate for Ocean City, 204 A.2d 688, 690 (Md. 1964)
(stating that curfews, introduced in England by William the Conqueror, were imposed to prevent
the citizens from assembling together in groups).
" See, e.g., People v. Richardson, 39 Cal. Rptr. 2d 17 (Cal. App. Dep't Super. Ct.
1994); Moorhead v. Farrelly, 723 F. Supp. 1109 (D.VI. 1989); United States v. Chalk, 441
F.2d 1277 (4th Cir. 1971); State v. Boles, 240 A.2d 920 (Conn. Cir. Ct. 1967); Thistlewood,
204 A.2d at 688.
'See, e.g., Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943); Korematsu v. United
States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
6See, e.g., Chase v. Twist, 323 F. Supp. 749 (E.D. Ark. 1970) (stating that curfews
were only imposed on black people).
7 See, e.g., Robinson v. Bd. of Regents of E. Ky. Univ., 475 F.2d 707 (6th Cir.
1973) (holding that a curfew imposing dormitory restrictions solely on women did not
violate equal protection because safety was a legitimate state concern).
s See Hutchins, 942 F. Supp. at 668 (stating that the curfew applied to those under
the age of seventeen); Ashton, 660 A.2d at 452 (stating that the curfew applied to those under
the age of eighteen); Qutb, 11 F.3d at 490 (stating that the curfew applied to those under the
age of seventeen).
' See Overtis Hicks Brantley, Curfews for Juveniles: More and More Cities Are
Adopting Them, ButAre They Constitutional? Yes: Safety is a Fundamental Right, A.B.A.J.,
Apr. 1994, at 40 (stating that the author "who helped write an Atlanta curfew law, which has
been in effect for three years, believes that carefully drawn statutes are essential to protecting
youths."); Alfonso A. Narvaez, New Curfews on Youths Due in Jersey, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 3,
1984, at B5 (stating that "lawyers for the American Civil Liberties Union have voiced opposition
... and have said they would challenge it in the courts on constitutional grounds."); Jean Kelso
Sandlin, Curfew Crew Cuts Violations, TIMEs-PIcAYUNE, Aug. 18, 1996, at 1H4 (quoting
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a division as to whether curfews are constitutional or unconstitutional and
whether they are even practical."0 After their passage, many curfew
ordinances face constitutional challenges." This note focuses on juvenile 2
curfews and the problems plaguing them. Part I examines the curfews,
focusing specifically on the provisions and exceptions they commonly
include. Part II focuses on the possible infringement of the juveniles'
constitutional rights when subject to curfews as they are commonly
drafted. This includes a discussion of the Equal Protection, First
Amendment, and Due Process rights of juveniles. Part III discusses the
possible infiingement of the constitutional rights of parents, including Due
Process rights and the right of parents to raise their children without
governmental interference. Part IV addresses problems in effectively
enforcing the curfews. Part V discusses the ramifications of enacting a
juvenile curfew in New York City and its chances for success.
Covington Police Chief Jerry DiFranco who stated "I think the [curfew] program is working out
fine."); Pam Milleville, Hearing Set in Lewiston on Curfew; Town Residents Have Chance To
Offer Views, BUFF. NEws, Sept. 26, 1994, at 5 (stating that Lewiston Councilman John Merino
feels that a curfew is unnecessary, while Police Captain Ronald R. Winkley feels a curfew would
effectively deter crime).
10 See, e.g., Brantley, supra note 9, at 40 (stating the opposing opinions of two
lawyers, American Civil Liberties Union Attorney Robyn E. Blumner and acting deputy city
attorney, Overtis Hicks Brantley); Narvaez, supra note 9, at B5 (stating the opposing opinions
of two police officials, Trenton Police Captain Thomas S. Williams and Willingboro Police Chief
Robert A. Rossell); Kenneth C. Crowe, Curfew Round Table Gets National Spin; 'Parade'
Magazine Will Feature Student Group's Spirited Discussion, TIMES UNION (Albany), Aug. 26,
1994, at BI (stating the conflicting opinions of four high school students with respect to the
curfew issue).
" See Hutchins, 942 F. Supp. at 666-67 (stating that the plaintiffs challenged the
curfew ordinance because it violated Fifth Amendment Equal Protection and Due Process
rights of the minors and their parents, it violated the Fourth Amendment right of the minors
to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures, and that it was overbroad and vague),
Ashton, 660 A.2d at 451 (stating that the plaintiffs in this case wanted a declaratory judgment,
injunctive relief, and monetary damages); Qutb, 11 F.3d at 491 n.4 (stating that the plaintiffs
brought suit to strike down the ordinance saying, among other things, that it restricted First
Amendment rights of free speech and association and it violated the right to be free from
unreasonable searches and seizures guaranteed by the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments).
12 The terms juvenile, minor, child[ren], and youth will be used interchangeably
throughout this note.
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I. THE CuRFEws: PROVISIONS AND EXCEPTIONS
According to a Justice Department report, ninety of the 200 largest
cities in the United States have juvenile curfews. 3 Various courts have
upheld 4 some curfews and invalidated 5 others. Some courts have
invalidated juvenile curfews for poor drafting, such as being overbroad or
vague. 6 Other courts have invalidated curfews for violating constitutional
principles, such as the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the
United States Constitution. " Accordingly, proper drafting is essential to
ensure a curfew's validity.'8
Most states enact curfews to protect minors from becoming
victims of crimes that occur in the late evening and early morning hours. 9
13 Fox Butterfield, Successes Reported for Curfews, but Doubts Persist, N.Y.
TIMEs, June 3, 1996, at Al (stating that laws have been enacted or toughened due to "a
tripling in the number of homicides by teen-agers.").
14 See, e.g., Bykofsky v. Borough of Middletown, 401 F. Supp. 1242 (M.D. Pa.
1975), affld mem., 535 F.2d 1245 (3d Cir. 1976); In re Juan C. 33 Cal. Rptr.2d 919 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1994); People in the Interest of J.M., 768 P.2d 219 (Colo 1989).
"S See, e.g., Hutchins, 942 F. Supp. at 665; Ashton, 660 A.2d at 447; Waters v.
Barry, 711 F. Supp. 1125 (D.D.C. 1989); Allen v. City of Bordentown, 524 A.2d 478 (N.J.
Super. Ct. Law Div. 1987).
"See, e.g. Ashton, 660 A.2d at 456 (holding the curfew ordinance unconstitutional
because its terms were vague); Hutchins, 942 F. Supp. at 667 (finding, in part, that the
curfew law was both overbroad and unconstitutionally vague).
"7 See, e.g., Allen, 524 A.2d at 487 (finding that the curfew was unconstitutional
because it did not allow children to exercise their fundamental constitutional rights and it
interfered with parents' right to allow their children to exercise their fundamental rights);
Hutchins, 942 F. Supp. at 668 (finding, in part, that the curfew law violated the minor's equal
protection and due process rights, in addition to the parents' due process rights).
8See Tona Trollinger, The Juvenile Curfew: Unconstitutional Imprisonment, 4 WM.
& MARY BiLL RTS. J. 949, 953 (1996) (stating that curfews should be "narrowly drawn to
accomplish proper social objectives."') (quoting Johnson v. City of Opelousas, 658 F.2d 1065,
1072 (5th Cir. 1981)).
" See James Gill, ACLU's Drive to Scrap City's Curfew, TIMEs-PICAYUNE, Sept.
16, 1994, at B7 (saying that keeping children off the streets convinces the public that less
children will become crime victims). But see Butterfield, supra note 13, at Al (stating that
"most juvenile crime occurs after school, from 3 to 6 P.M., not late at night when most of
680 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTs [Vol. XIV
Another reason often set forth is to protect other citizens from crimes
perpetrated by these minors.2° Yet another reason is to encourage parental
support and control over children.21 These reasons, if supported by
convincing statistical evidence, can serve as rational grounds for enacting
the curfews,22 provided the curfews meet other constitutional guidelines.
In fact, both President Clinton and former presidential candidate, Bob
Dole, supported and encouraged the enactment of juvenile curfews in
response to the juvenile crime problem when campaigning during the 1996
presidential election.23 That juvenile curfews receive so much attention
reveals the severity of the youth crime problem facing our country.24
Many feel that curfews are the solution.25 Evidence shows that curfews
can be, and in some cities have been, a solution to the juvenile crime
problem.26
the curfews are in force.").
20 See Pamela Katz, Curfews Infringe On Parents' Rights, TIMEs UNION (Albany,
NY), June 23, 1996, at E2 (stating that politicians enact curfews to combat juvenile crime).
21 See Paterson Mayor Proposes Curfew For City Troubled By Teen-Agers'
Crimes, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 1, 1985, at 54 (quoting Frank X. Graves Jr., Paterson's mayor, as
saying that he enacted the curfew to put the parents back in charge of their children); see also
Kristi Wright, Teens Speak Out on Curfew Laws Around the U.S., OMAHA WORLD HERALD,
June 25, 1996, at 37. President Clinton recently supported curfews by saying, "They're
designed to help people be better parents .... They give parents a tool to impart discipline."
Id.
22 See Hutchins, 942 F. Supp. at 675 (saying that the statistical data must be
supportive enough to convince the court that there is a real need to enact the curfew).
23 See Aaron Roston, Do You Know Where Your Child Is?, NEWSDAY
(Nassau/Suffolk), June 11, 1996, at A68. President Bill Clinton advocated the idea of more
cities and towns enacting curfews to combat juvenile violence and promote family values.
Id.; Butterfield, supra note 13, at Al (stating that President Clinton and Bob Dole advocated
the enactment ofjuvenile curfews across the country).
24 See Youth Crime: The Trends Aren't All Bad, U.S. NEws & WORLD REP., Dec.
23, 1996, at 13 (citing FBI statistics showing a rise in juvenile crime rates).
25 See Butterfield, supra note 13, at Al (quoting Sergeant Jim Chandler of Dallas
who stated that "[tihese [crime rate] figures tell us that the curfew works."). See also supra
note 23 and accompanying text.
26 See id. (citing statistics from Dallas, where both violent and overall juvenile
crimes have decreased since the curfew's enactment).
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Generally, different curfews will contain similar provisions.27 For
example, a majority of curfew ordinances apply to minors under the age
of either seventeen or eighteen," restricting their movement between the
hours of 10:00 or 11:00 p.m. and 6:00 a.m. on weekdays29 and between
midnight and 6:00 a.m. on weekends." The ordinances also set out
exceptions and defenses.3' Some frequently used exceptions are:
emergency situations,32 travelling to or from a job,33 travelling to or from
a school function, 3' travelling to or from a religious function,35 running an
17 Compare Hutchins, 942 F. Supp. at 665; Ashton v. Brown, 660 A.2d 447 (Md.
1995); and Bykofsky v. Borough of Middletown, 401 F. Supp. 1242 (M.D. Pa. 1975), affld
mem., 535 F.2d 1245 (3d Cir. 1976) (showing the similarities in the curfew ordinances).
" See, e.g., Wayne King, Trenton Lawmakers Pass Bill Allowing for Night
Curfews, N.Y. TIMEs, Sept. 15, 1992, at B5 (stating that municipalities in New Jersey can
enact curfews that apply to youths under the age of eighteen); Ronald Smothers, Atlanta Sets
a Curfew for Youths, Prompting Concern on Race Bias, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 21, 1990, at Al
(stating that the curfew for Atlanta applies to anyone under seventeen years of age); Terry
Pristin, Camden to Enforce Curfew, N.Y. TIMES, May 22, 1996, at B I (stating that Camden's
curfew applies to those under the age of eighteen); Toni Locy, D.C. Curfew Overturned in
Federal Court; Judge Cites City's Use of 'Flawed Statistics', WASH. POST, Oct. 30, 1996, at
Al (saying that Washington D.C.'s curfew applies to those youths under seventeen years of
age).
29 See, e.g., King, supra note 28, at B5 (stating that, if enacted, the New Jersey
curfews would be in effect between 10:00 p.m. and 6:00 a.m.); Robert Hanley, Authorities
Turn to Curfews to Clear the Streets of Teen-Agers, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 8, 1993, at BI
(showing the curfew hours as 10:00 p.m. until 6:00 a.m.); Qutb v. Strauss, 11 F.3d 488,490
(5th Cir. 1993) (stating that the curfew ordinance is in effect "from 11 p.m. until 6 a.m. on
week nights, and from 12 midnight until 6 a.m. on weekends.").
" See, e.g., Smothers, supra note 28, at Al (stating that the hours for the Atlanta
curfew are between 12:00 and 6:00 a.m. on weekends); Locy, supra note 28, at Al (showing
the weekend hours when the curfew is in effect as being midnight to 6:00 a.m.).
"' See Trollinger, supra note 18, at 952-53 (stating that "[t]o conform to judicial
precedent and anticipated constitutional challenges, the juvenile law typically excepts certain
activities.").
32 See Hutchins, 942 F. Supp. at 682 (citing D.C. CODE ANN. § 6-2183(b)(l)(E)
which allows involvement in an emergency as a defense to a curfew violation).
" Id. (citing D.C. CODE ANN. § 6-2183(b)(1)(D) allowing for travel to and from
a job as a defense to a curfew violation).
14 Id. (citing D.C. CODE ANN. § 6-2183(b)(1)(G) which considers attending a
school function as an exception to the curfew ordinance).
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errand for a parent or guardian,36 participating in interstate travel," being
accompanied by a parent or guardian, 1 and exercising a First Amendment
right.39 Courts invalidate curfews created without adequate exceptions,
both for violating a minor's constitutional rights and for being overbroad.4"
II. CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS WITH CURFEWS
A. Equal Protection, Fundamental Rights, and Juvenile Curfews
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
United States Constitution states that "[n]o State shall ... deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."'" "The
Equal Protection Clause ... is essentially a direction that all persons
similarly situated should be treated alike."42 The states are, therefore,
restricted in their use of suspect classifications43 based on race,"
" Id. (citing D.C. CODE ANN. § 6-2183(b)(1)(G) which considers attending a
religious function as an exception to the curfew ordinance).
36 Id. (citing D.C. CODE ANN. § 6-2183(b)(1)(B) which considers running and
errand with parental permission as a defense to a curfew violation).
" See Bykofsky v. Borough of Middletown, 401 F. Supp. 1242, 1270 (M.D. Pa.
1975), affd mem., 535 F.2d 1245 (3d Cir. 1976) (exempting interstate travel from the curfew
provisions).
38 Id. at 1269 (showing that if the juvenile is with a parent or guardian, the curfew
has not been violated).
" Id.(stating that the exercise of a First Amendment right, such as freedom of
religion, speech, or assembly, is an exception to the curfews provisions).
' See Johnson v. City of Opelousas, 658 F.2d 1065, 1074 (5th Cir. 1981) (holding
that "[s]ince the absence of exceptions on the curfew ordinance precludes a narrowing
construction, we are compelled to rule that the ordinance is constitutionally overbroad."); see
also discussion infra Part ll.B.
41 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I (Equal Protection Clause).
42 See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432,439 (1985).
43 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 1, at 1446. "[Cllassifications that are
based upon a trait which itself seems to colitravene established constitutional principles so
that any purposeful use of the classification may be deemed 'suspect'. Examples include
race, sex, national origin and alienage (with exceptions)." Id.; see generally Loving v.
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alienage,45 gender,46 or illegitimacy"7 when creating and enforcing
legislation. However, age has never been considered a suspect
classification.48 "Equal protection analysis requires strict scrutiny of a
legislative classification . . . when the classification impermissibly
interferes with the exercise of a fundamental right .... " To withstand
strict scrutiny analysis, a state has the burden of proving that the law in
Virginia, 388 U.S. 1,10 (1967). "The clear and central purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment
was to eliminate all official state sources of invidious racial discrimination in the States." Id.; San
Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1,28 (1973) (setting out the factors used to
describe a suspect classification).
44 See, e.g., Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 310 (1879) (holding that the
act in question discriminated against blacks, and therefore violated the Equal Protection
Clause); Loving, 388 U.S. at 12 (holding that Virginia's statute prohibiting interracial
marriage was based solely on invidious racial discrimination and violated the Equal Protection
Clause); Yiek Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373-74 (1886) (holding that if legislation is both
applied and administered by public authorities and unjustly discriminates between similarly
situated persons, it has violated the Equal Protection Clause).
45 See, e.g., Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 230 (1982) (deciding that free state
education cannot be withheld from illegal aliens); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 381
(1971) (stating that aliens cannot be denied welfare benefits); In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717,
729 (1973) (holding that resident aliens may not be barred from practicing law).
'See, e.g., Wengler v. Druggists Mutual Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142, 147 (1980) (dealing
with a state law denying death benefits to widowers who could not prove dependence or physical
disability while providing death benefits to all widows whose husbands died in job-related
accidents); Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 719-20 (1982) (dealing with
a state nursing school's women-only admission policy).
"' See, e.g., Weber v Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164, 168 (1972)
(addressing Louisiana's workmen's compensation statute providing that "[u]nacknowledged
illegitimate children ... [are not within the class of children, but] are relegated to the lesser
status of 'other dependents,' . . . and may recover only if there are not enough surviving
dependents in the preceding classifications to exhaust the maximum allowable benefits.");
Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 70-71 (1968) (dealing with a Louisiana statute that refused
to allow unacknowledged illegitimate children to bring a wrongful death action for their
mother's death); Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 763 (1977) (dealing with an Illinois
statute that did not allow illegitimate children to inherit from their fathers).
" See, e.g., Massachusetts Bd.of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 311-12
(1976) (deciding that age is not a suspect classification); Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452,
470 (1991) (upholding the mandatory retirement age for state judges because the Court did
not consider age to be a suspect classification).
49Murgia, 427 U.S. at 312.
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question is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest.5"
The United States Constitution guarantees all persons fundamental
rights, such as First Amendment rights,5" the right to travel,52 the right to
privacy,53 the right to many,5 4 and the right to vote.55 All of these rights
apply to adults, and some apply to minors.56 Although these rights apply
" Piyier, 457 U.S. at 216-17 (stating the strict scrutiny test).
3' U.S. CONST. amend I. According to the First Amendment, "Congress shall make
no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to
assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances." Id.
"iSee Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 630 (1969) (finding a fundamental right
to interstate travel); City of Panora v. Simmons, 445 N.W.2d 363,367 (Iowa 1989) "The notion
that a person's right to merely wander and stroll about town, as well as to travel interstate, is a
fundamental right that appears to have its roots in the case of Papachristou v. City of
Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972). "). In Papachristou, Justice Douglas stated that
"wandering and strolling," while
not mentioned in the Constitution or in the Bill of Rights . . . [are]
unwritten amenities [which] have been in part responsible for giving our
people the feeling of independence and self-confidence, the feeling of
creativity. These amenities have dignified the right of dissent and have
honored the right to be nonconformists and the right to defy
submissiveness. They have encouraged lives of high spirits rather than
hushed, suffocating silence.
Simmons, 445 N.W.2d at 367 (citing Papachristou, 405 U.S. at 164); Aptheker v. Secretary of
State, 378 U.S. 500, 520 (1964) (Douglas, J., concurring) ("Freedom of movement is the very
essence of our free society .... Once the right to travel is curtailed, all other rights suffer, just
as when curfew or home detention is placed on a person.").
53 See Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969) (saying that "also fundamental
is the right to be free, except in very limited circumstances, from unwanted governmental
intrusions into one's privacy.").
' See Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 383 (1978) (finding a fundamental right
to marry).
" See Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 665 (1966) (finding a
fundamental right to vote).
6 See, e.g., Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 633 (1979) (plurality opinion) (finding
that children are not denied constitutional protection solely because of their status as minors);
Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976) (finding that "[c]onstitutional rights
do not mature and come into being magically only when one attains the state-defined age of
majority."); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 13 (1967) (finding that the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth
Amendment apply to children as well as adults); Tinker v. Des Moines Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503,
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to minors, there are, however, certain limitations resulting from the United
States Supreme Court's decision in Bellotti v. Baird.57  In Bellotti, a
plurality of the Court concluded that "[t]he constitutional rights of children
cannot be equated with [the rights] of adults... [because of] the peculiar
vulnerability of children; their inability to make critical decisions in an
informed, mature manner; and the importance of the parental role in child
rearing."58 However, since the United States Supreme Court has not yet
decided a case dealing with juvenile rights in the context of juvenile
curfews, there is no uniform standard for the lower courts to follow.59
Although the Bellotti factors generally control in cases where one must
distinguish between the constitutional protections afforded to juveniles and
adults,6 many lower courts, in applying the Bellotti factors, have disagreed
about whether minors are guaranteed fundamental rights.61
After detecting the possible infringement of a fundamental right
or the presence of a suspect classification, a court must apply strict
511 (1969) (stating that "[students] are possessed of fundamental rights which the State must
respect,....").
57 443 U.S. 622 (showing that a plurality of the Court upheld a parental notification
requirement for minors seeking abortions while invalidating the parental consent requirement).
5" Id. at 634 (setting forth the three Bellotti factors the Court used to determine
when the state may give constitutional rights of children less deference than those of adults).
9 See Sam R. Hananel, Qutb v. Strauss: The Fifth Circuit Upholds a Narrowly
Tailored Juvenile Curfew Ordinance, 69 TuL. L. REv. 308, 310 (1994).
60 See Johnson v. City of Opelousas, 658 F.2d 1065, 1073 (5th Cir. 1981);
McCollester v. City of Keene, 586 F. Supp. 1381, 1385-86 (D.N.H. 1984).
" See Deerfield v. Greenberg, 550 N.E.2d 12, 16 (111. App. Ct. 1990) (applying the
Bellotti factors and upholding the curfew ordinance because it was enacted due to the
"particular vulnerability of children" and because it furthered the parental role in raising
children); People in the Interest of J.M., 768 P.2d 219, 223 (Colo. 1989) (finding the
presence of the three Bellotti factors, upholding the curfew ordinance and holding "[t]hat
J.M.'s liberty interest in freedom of movement does not constitute a fundamental right.");
McCollester, 586 F. Supp. at 1385 (invalidating the ordinance and finding that "[b]ecause
this ordinance sweeps so broadly in prohibiting innocent juvenile activities, the City fails to
meet the three-prong test of Bellotti ... for validity of restraints on minors which would be
unconstitutional if placed on adults."); Waters v. Barry, 711 F. Supp. 1125, 1137 (D.D.C.
1989) ("[a]pplying the Bellotti factors, . . . [and holding] that the context in which the
District seeks to enforce the Act does not justify differentiating between the constitutional
rights of minors and adults.").
N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTs
scrutiny to the ordinance in question to determine if there has been an
equal protection violation.62 If the curfew ordinance neither implicates a
fundamental right nor involves a suspect class, the courts must apply the
rational basis test.6' Accordingly, because different courts have analyzed
juvenile curfews differently, there have been inconsistent results, where
some curfews were upheld while others were invalidated.64
1. Curfews Upheld Under Equal Protection Analysis
The Pennsylvania District Court in Bykofsky v. Borough of
Middletown,65 held that the juvenile curfew ordinance,' in effect in the
Borough of Middletown, County of Dauphin, and Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania, did not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution because "[tihe
ordinance applie[d] alike to all persons under the age of eighteen [and
therefore,] there clearly [was] no equal protection violation within the class
subject to the curfew."67 After finding that age was not a suspect
classification and that the curfew ordinance did not violate a fundamental
right, the court applied the rational basis test to the ordinance.6" The court
stated that "there is a rational relationship between the legitimate ends
sought and the means chosen... [since] [t]he age classification.., rests
on real and substantial differences between adults and minors.... 69 The
62See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
63 Id. at 40 (stating that to uphold the state ordinance, the state must show that the
ordinance is rationally related to a legitimate state interest).
"See, e.g., Bykofsky v. Middletown, 401 F. Supp. 1242 (M.D. Pa. 1975), affid
mem., 535 F.2d 1245 (3d Cir. 1976) (holding that the curfew ordinance did not violate the
Equal Protection Clause); Waters, 711 F. Supp. at 1139 (holding that the statute violated the
Equal Protection Clause); Allen v. City of Bordentown, 524 A.2d 478 (N.J. Ct. Law Div.
1987) (holding that the ordinance was an unconstitutional denial of equal protection rights).
63401 F. Supp. 1242 (M.D. Pa. 1975), affidmem., 535 F.2d 1245 (3d Cir. 1976).
66 Id. at 1266-67 (discussing the 1975 ordinance, number 662, which was enacted
in the Borough of Middletown, County of Dauphin, and the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania).67Id. at 1266.
RId. at 1265.
69 Id.
686 [Vol. XIV
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court held that applying curfews to those eighteen and under was not
arbitrary, unreasonable, or violative of the Equal Protection Clause.7"
Additionally, the court compared the curfew's restrictions to other
fundamental rights that minors do not possess:
The Middletown curfew applies to all those under the age
of eighteen, and a very fundamental right, namely, the
right to vote, is denied to this same age group ...
mouths under the age of eighteen have traditionally been
regulated... they generally lack the power to contract, to
marry without parental consent, to own a gun, to purchase
or consume alcoholic beverages ... 71
The court, by looking at other regulations imposed on minors, determined
that the curfew was akin to these other regulations and, therefore, found
that the curfew did not violate minors' constitutional rights.72
In Qutb v. Strauss,7 3 the Fifth Circuit applied strict scrutiny to the
Dallas, Texas curfew ordinance74 and held that the city had compelling
interests in enacting the curfew ordinance.75 The court then stated that
because there were defenses to curfew violations, the ordinance was
narrowly drawn, met its goals, and still respected the minors' rights.76 The
city's compelling interests were to "(1) [r]educe the number of juvenile
crime victims; (2) reduce injury accidents involving juveniles; .. .(4)
provide additional options for dealing with gang problems; (5) reduce
juveniles peer pressure to stay out late; and (6) assist parents in the control
7 Bykofsky, 401 F. Supp. at 1266.
71 Id.
72 Id.
71 11 F.3d 488 (5th Cir. 1993).
74 Id. at 496 (discussing the 1992 ordinance, number 21309, amending chapter 31
of the Dallas City Code, prohibiting persons under 17 from being out in a public place
between 11:00 p.m. and 6:00 a.m. on week nights and midnight until 6:00 a.m. on weekends).
" Id. at 492.7
1 Id. at 494.
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of their children."' Therefore, since the state demonstrated its compelling
interest in protecting the children of Dallas and the ordinance was
narrowly tailored to this governmental interest, the Fifth Circuit upheld the
constitutionality of this statute.7"
In People v. Walton,79 the Appellate Department of the Superior
Court of California upheld the curfew ordinance8" after deciding that "[iut
is competent for the legislature to provide regulations for the protection of
children of immature years."" The court compared this legislation to the
requirement of mandatory education by stating:
The right of a state to make and enforce provisions for the
compulsory education of all children is clearly recognized
as is the right to enact laws classifying persons by their
age for the purpose of dealing with them as dependent or
delinquent persons, such as the juvenile court law and
laws to prevent school children from joining fraternities.82
The Walton court upheld the ordinance.83 It reasoned that the ordinance
prohibited only those under eighteen from remaining or loitering on public
streets during specified hours; It did not prohibit them from walking
through the streets of Los Angeles during those hours.84 The basis for the
77 Id. at 494 n.8.
78 Qutb, 11 F.3d at 496.
" 161 P.2d 498 (Cal. App. Dep't Super. Ct. 1945).
o Id. at 499 (discussing the curfew ordinance in question, number 4256, New
Series, of Los Angeles County which amended the original ordinance, number 3611, which
had also been amended by ordinance number 4464 and provided that those under 18 could
not remain or loiter on public streets between the hours of 9:00 p.m. and 4:00 a.m.).
"I Id. at 502.
RId. (quoting 5 CAL.JuR. 842, par. 199).
n People v. Walton, 161 P.2d 498 (Cal. App. Dept Super. Ct. 1945).
84 Id. at 502. But see Ex parte McCarver, 46 S.W. 936-37 (1898) (stating that
prohibiting those under 21 from being on the streets after 9:00 p.m. unduly invaded those
affected persons' personal liberties).
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court's decision was that the ordinance provisions were regulatory."5 The
court placed great importance on the distinction between provisions which
were regulatory and those that were prohibitory.8 6
2. Curfews Invalidated Under Equal Protection Analysis
The United States District Court for the District of Columbia in
Waters v. Barry,87 analyzed the curfew ordinance8 using strict scrutiny
because "the Act directly burdens the First Amendment rights and Fifth
Amendment liberty interests of the thousands of innocent minors who
reside in or who may visit the District of Columbia." 9 The District set out
its purposes in enacting the curfew ordinance, which included,
"protect[ing] juveniles from harm,... [and] insulat[ing] them from the
evils of the street. 90 The court, however, determined that applying the
curfew only to juveniles did not advance any of the objectives that the
District had set forth, and that it was neither rationally related, nor
narrowly tailored, to achieving those objectives.9' The opinion stated that
"[w]hen [dealing with] fundamental interests[,] . . . the classification
chosen [must] bear an intimate relationship to the problem."92 The court
concluded that for the curfew to successfully resolve all the problems
warranting its creation, it would have to deter those youths who presently
" Walton, 161 P.2d at 501 (stating that this ordinance was regulatory in that it did
not restrict those under 21 from going from one place to another after 9:00 p.m.).
86/d.
'711 F. Supp. 1125 (D.D.C. 1989).
Id. at 1141-42 (discussing the "Temporary Curfew Emergency Act of 1989",
codified at D.C. CODE § 6-1509 (Supp. 1989), which applies to persons under 18, between
the hours of 11:00 p.m. and 6:00 a.m. on weeknights and between 11:59 p.m. and 6:00 a.m.
on weekends and prohibits them from remaining on any street or in any public place).
'Id. at 1139. The court referred to the Fifth Amendment instead of the Fourteenth
Amendment because the Fifth Amendment not the Fourteenth Amendment applies to the
District of Columbia. Women Prisoners of District of Columbia Dept. of Corrections v.
D.C., 93 F.3d 910, 924 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
" Waters, 711 F. Supp. at 1139.
91 Id.
92Id.
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commit violent and dangerous acts from committing such acts." The
court also pointed out that almost everything the curfew purported to
avoid was already illegal, and, therefore, was punishable by more severe
methods than the punishment for violating the curfew.94 Additionally, the
court suggested that the curfew would affect those juveniles who would
ordinarily obey the law.95 Finally, the statistical evidence offered did not
support the District's determination of the necessity of this curfew.96
Accordingly, after examining the statistical evidence, in conjunction with
the curfew's objectives, the court determined that although the objectives
were valid, the curfew was not narrowly tailored to achieve those
objectives, and therefore, did not justify infringing upon the constitutional
rights of those affected.97
InAllen v. City of Bordentown,98 the New Jersey Superior Court
reasoned that although the Bordentown curfew ordinance99 affected
fundamental rights, it did not necessarily mean that those rights could not
be regulated."° The court analyzed the curfew by using the strict scrutiny
test and by asking whether the City of Bordentown had a compelling
interest in enacting a curfew that would limit the fundamental rights of
juveniles, while not imposing the same limitations on adults.'' The court
held that the curfew ordinance violated juveniles' rights to equal protection
under the law because it "demonstrat[es] not only.., lack of a compelling
government interest in the curfew restrictions, but the opposite - a
compelling government interest in the encouragement of many activities
93Id.
94 Id.
95 Waters, 711 F. Supp. at 1139.
96 
Id.
97 d. at 1139-40 (stating that the court granted summary judgment for the plaintiffs
on their First and Fifth Amendment claims).
9 524 A.2d 478 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1987).
'Id. at 480 (discussing the Bordentown curfew ordinance, enacted as an amendment
to an anti-loitering ordinance, prohibiting persons under 18 from being in public places between
9:00 p.m. and 6:00 a.m.).
00 Id. at 486.
101Id.
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which the ordinance prohibits. 1 2 The court also found that by impeding
the juveniles' constitutional rights, the ordinance interfered with parental
rights as well.0" The court struck down the ordinance, holding that it was
vague, overbroad, lacked a showing of compelling state interest, and
unconstitutionally infringed upon parental and juvenile rights. 104
B. First Amendment, Overbreadth Doctrine, and Juvenile Curfews
When curfew ordinances fail to provide adequate exceptions, 05
they infringe upon the First Amendment rights that minors possess.'0 6
Despite this, Judge Charles R. Richey"°7 opined in Waters, that "it is what
these curfews restrict, and not what they exempt, that matters most."'0 8
Judge Richey, in comparing the ordinance in Waters"° to the ordinance in
Bykofsky," 0 noted important differences between the two."' He stated,
"[T]he Middletown ordinance contained a broad exemption for the
02 ld.
103 Allen, 524 A.2d at 487 (stating that the curfew restricts parental rights because
most parents want their children to be able to exercise their constitutional rights).
104 Id.
105 See, e.g., Hutchins v. District of Columbia, 942 F. Supp. 665, 682 (D.D.C.
1996) (citing First Amendment exceptions to the District of Columbia's juvenile curfew
ordinance); Bykofsky v. Borough of Middletown, 401 F. Supp. 1242, 1270 (M.D. Pa. 1975),
affld mem., 535 F.2d 1245 (3d Cir. 1976) (stating that the exercise of a First Amendment
right, such as freedom of religion, speech, or assembly, is an exception to the curfew's
provisions).
16 See Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976) (stating that
"[c]onstitutional rights do not mature and come into being magically only when one attains
the state-defined age of majority."); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 13 (1967) (stating that "whatever
may be their precise impact, neither the Fourteenth Amendment nor the Bill of Rights is for
adults alone."); Tinker v. Des Moines Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969) (stating that school
officials do not possess absolute power over the students, and that students are "persons" under
the Constitution and accordingly, possess certain fundamental rights).
107 Judge Charles R. Richey, District Judge for the United States District Court for
the District of Columbia, wrote the opinion in Waters. Waters, 711 F. Supp. at 1125.
'
08 Id. at 1136.
1°" 711 F. Supp. 1125 (D.D.C. 1989).
10 401 F. Supp. 1242 (M.D. Pa. 1975), affid mem., 535 F.2d 1245 (3d Cir. 1976).
... See infra notes 109-111 and accompanying text.
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exercise of First Amendment rights.... The Act [in Waters] contains no
equivalent exemption.""' 2 Judge Richey invalidated the ordinance in
Waters". while the ordinance in Bykofsky was upheld." 4
In addition to failing to provide exceptions, curfew ordinances
may also fail under the overbreadth doctrine. "5 The overbreadth doctrine
falls within the discussion of First Amendment rights. 116 "The overbreadth
doctrine applies when a law 'does not aim specifically at evils within the
allowable area of [government] control but ... sweeps within its ambit
other activities that in ordinary circumstances constitute an exercise' of
protected First Amendment rights.""' 7 An ordinance that affects a person's
ability to exercise his/her constitutional rights is unconstitutionally
overbroad if a more narrowly tailored ordinance would accomplish the
same objective." Courts will not uphold curfews drafted in such a
manner." 9 "The framers recognized the futility and danger of creating a
shopping list of rights and drafted the [F]irst [A]mendment in broad
language to protect against the evils of strict construction based upon
barren enumeration."'20  Many curfews have faced overbreadth
challenges.' Some courts have invalidated these curfews for being
l' See Martin P. Hogan, Waters v. Bary: Juvenile Curfews -- The D.C. Council's
"Quick Fix"for the Drug Crisis, 1 GEo. MASON U. CIv. RTs. L.J. 313, 341 n.49 (1990)
(quoting Waters v. Barry, 711 F.Supp. 1125, 1136 n. 24 (D.D.C. 1989)).
"' 711 F. Supp. at 1125.
14 401 F. Supp. at 1242.
15 See, e.g., Johnson v. City of Opelousas, 658 F.2d 1065, 1074 (5th Cir. 1981)
(finding the Opelousas curfew overbroad and therefore, unconstitutional).
"
6 See City ofMaquoketa v. Russell, 484 N.W.2d 179, 186 (Iowa 1992) (stating that
courts use overbreadth analysis when there is a denial of First Amendment rights).
"'Allen v. City ofBordentown, 524 A.2d 478,482 (N.J. Ct. Law Div. 1987) (citing
Thomhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 97 (1940)).
18 See id.
"9 See, e.g., Johnson, 658 F.2d at 1074 (holding that Opelousas' curfew was
unconstitutional because it was overbroad); Hutchins v. District of Columbia, 942 F. Supp.
665 (D.D.C. 1996) (holding that the District of Columbia's curfew was not narrowly tailored,
and was therefore, unconstitutional).
.
2 See Hogan, supra note 112, at 338.
1' See, e.g., Johnson, 658 F.2d at 1071; McCollester v. City of Keene, 586 F.
Supp. 1381, 1385 (D.N.H. 1984);Allen, 524 A.2d at 482-84.
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overbroad,'22 while other courts found sufficient exceptions within the
curfews thereby defeating overbreadth challenges.123
The New Jersey Superior Court, after examining the exceptions
in the Bordentown ordinance in Allen, stated that the ordinance limits the
rights of all minors, emancipated and unemancipated."' The only
exceptions that the legislature provided were:
(1) [W]hen a minor is accompanied by a parent or
guardian, or (2) is upon an emergency errand or
legitimate business consented to by the parent or
guardian, and then only if the minor possesses a pass
issued by the police department upon application of the
parent or guardian, or (3) under emergent conditions
precluding application for a pass provided the minor
possesses a note from the parent or guardian identifying
the minor, the emergency, involved and the time of day
to be encompassed by the note.'25
These exceptions do not provide for any activities protected by the First
Amendment, such as: school events, situations when a parent cannot write
a note because of the emergency situation, or incapacitation.'26 The court
held that "the ordinance is unconstitutionally overbroad. It contains
unnecessarily sweeping restrictions of fundamental personal liberties of
children and adults: their freedom of speech, assembly and religion...., 27
122 See, e.g. Johnson, 658 F.2d at 1074 (holding that Opelousas' curfew was
unconstitutional because it was overbroad); Hutchins, 942 F. Supp. at 665 (holding that the
District of Columbia's curfew was not narrowly tailored, and was therefore, unconstitutional).
123 See, e.g. In re Daniel W., 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d 202, 206 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995)
(stating that the curfew ordinance was upheld because it prohibited loitering and did not just
prohibit presence on the street); Qutb v. Strauss, 11 F.3d 488, 494 (5th Cir. 1993) (finding
that the curfew ordinance, unlike the ordinance in Johnson, was not overbroad because of
the many exemptions it contained).114 SeeAllen, 524 A.2d at 483.
125 Id. at 482-83.
'.. Id. at 483.
127 Id.
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In Johnson v. City of Opelousas,121 the Fifth Circuit held that the
curfew ordinance was "constitutionally infirm in its breadth."'129 The Fifth
Circuit compared the challenged ordinance to the ordinance in Aladdin's
Castle, Inc. v. City of Mesquite,3' where the court struck down the
ordinance prohibiting operators of pinball parlors from allowing anyone
under the age of seventeen to use the machines unless accompanied by a
parent or guardian.' 3' The Aladdin court stated that there were other ways
to shield the children from undesirable influences.3 2 Additionally, the
court in Aladdin stated that "[t]he deterrents ordinarily to be applied to
prevent crime are education and punishment for violations of the law, not
abridgement of the rights of free speech and assembly. 33 The Aladdin
ordinance did not further a compelling interest and was not narrowly
tailored "to avoid unnecessary abridgement of associational freedom" and
was therefore, unconstitutional."3 4 The court in Johnson found that "[t]he
ordinance at issue here target[ed] the same age group, but cast[] a much
broader net over the associational rights of minors by seeking to keep them
off the streets altogether during certain hours.' 1  The court found the
curfew overbroad because it lacked significant exceptions.'36
In City ofMaquoketa v. Russell,137 the Supreme Court of Iowa
... 658 F.2d 1065 (5th Cir. 1981).
19 Id. at 1071. Relying on Aladdin's Castle, Inc. v. City of Mesquite, 630 F.2d
1029, 1038 n.13 (5th Cir. 1980),prob.juris. noted, 455 U.S. 283 (1982), the court held that
the curfew ordinance was overbroad and that it "'swe[pt] within its ambit other activities that
in ordinary circumstances constitute an exercise' of protected expressive or associational
rights." Id.
13o 630 F.2d 1029 (5th Cir. 1980),prob.juris noted, 455 U.S. 283 (1982).
... Id. at 1044.
..Id. at 1042.
133 Id. (citing Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 378 (1927) (Brandeis, J.,
concurring).
" Id. at 1041 (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 25 (1976)).
135 Johnson v. City of Opelousas, 658 F.2d 1065, 1071 n.8 (5th Cir. 1981).
'
36 Id. at 1074.
13 484 N.W.2d 179 (Iowa 1992).
694 [Vol. XIV
1998] JUVENILE CURFEWS 695
found the Maquoketa curfew ordinance' overbroad.'39 "The court then
stated that the Maquoketajuvenile curfew ordinance might have operated
to prevent minors from participating in activities involving those
fundamental rights, such as church services, precinct caucuses, city
council meetings, protests and demonstrations, and labor union
meetings."'4 ° The court based its decision on the importance of creating
curfew ordinances narrowly to avoid encroaching on First Amendment
fundamental rights.' 4
C. Due Process, Fundamental Rights, and Juvenile Curfews
Substantive due process is the "[d]octrine that due process clauses
of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution
require legislation to be fair and reasonable in content as well as
application.... [and also] the constitutional guarantee that no person shall
be arbitrarily deprived of his life, liberty or property."'42 "No right is more
sacred, or is more carefully guarded, by the liberty assurance of the due
process clause than the right of every citizen to the possession and control
of his own person, free from restraint or interference by the state.""' The
Supreme Court, under the Due Process Clause, has acknowledged
138 Id. at 181 (discussing the ordinance in question, ordinance number 3-1-6,
adopted on November 6, 1989, which prohibited persons under 18 from being on the street
or in any public place from 11:00 p.m. until 6:00 a.m.).
139 d. at 186.
140 See Natalie M. Williams, Updated Guidelines For Juvenile Curfews: City of
Maquoketa v. Russell, 79 IowA L. REv. 465,470 (1994) (examining the Russell opinion and
the types of enforcement exceptions a juvenile curfew ordinance must provide to withstand
vagueness and overbreadth challenges).
U'1 Russell, 484 N.W.2d at 186.
142 BLAC'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 1, at 1429.
141 See Bykofsky v. Borough of Middletown, 401 F. Supp. 1242, 1255 (M.D. Pa.
1975), affd mem., 535 F.2d 1245 (3d Cir. 1976) (citing Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Botsford, 141
U.S. 250 (1891)).
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juveniles' constitutional rights.'" In fact, many juvenile curfews have been
challenged on Due Process grounds. 4 '
In determining whether there has been a Due Process violation,
similar to an Equal Protection violation, courts decide whether the
ordinance in question encroaches on any fundamental right that the minor
possesses."' 6 Just as in Equal Protection analysis, if the curfew ordinance
infringes on a fundamental right, it is subject to strict scrutiny, and,
therefore, must be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest.'47
"'[l1t is necessary in some instances to infer the standard used through
reliance on the justifications provided by the court to uphold or strike
down the [juvenile curfew ordinances]"..4 ' because of the inconsistent
results from the different courts after analyzing curfew ordinances using
the Bellotti factors,4 9 and the fact that the Supreme Court has not yet set
out a level of scrutiny applicable to juvenile curfews.' ° Since minors do
not always have the same fundamental rights as adults, courts have used
144 See, e.g., Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 263 (1984) (stating that children
involved in criminal cases are afforded certain procedural rights also afforded to adults);
Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 693 (1977) (plurality opinion) (stating that
minors are afforded the right to privacy in the context of procreation); Goss v. Lopez, 419
U.S. 565, 574 (1975) (stating that minors are entitled to due process protections in the
context of education); Poe v. Gerstein, 517 F.2d 787, 791 (5th Cir. 1975), affid sub nom.,
Gerstein v. Coe, 428 U.S. 901 (1976) (stating that minors are entitled to have abortions).
145 See, e.g., Johnson, 658 F.2d 1065, 1068 (stating that the appellants in this case
claimed that the curfew ordinance violated the 14th Amendments Due Process Clause);
McCollester, 586 F. Supp. at 1384 (stating that the court found the curfew ordinance violated
the rights guaranteed by the 14th Amendment's Due Process Clause).
146 See discussion supra Part I.A.
147 See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202,216-17 (1982).
14 See Peter L. Scherr, Note, The Juvenile Curfew Ordinance: In Search ofA New
Standard, 41 WASH. U.J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 163, 183 n.91 (1992) (citing Martin E.
Mooney, Note, Assessing the Constitutional Validity ofJuvenile Curfew Statutes, 52 NOTRE
DAME LAW. 858, 872 (1977)).
149 Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 634 (1979) (stating the three reasons why a
court can treat minors differently than adults: "the peculiar vulnerability of children; their
inability to make critical decisions in an informed manner, and the importance of the parental
role in child rearing").
..
0See Scherr, supra note 148, at 192.
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different levels of scrutiny to analyze the curfew ordinances.' Some have
used strict scrutiny"' and others have used the rational basis test.'
Consequently, the inconsistent results by different courts regarding the
fundamental rights of minors also produce inconsistent results regarding
juvenile curfew ordinances in the area of substantive due process.'54
D. Void for Vagueness
"A law is void for vagueness if it is so ambiguous that reasonable
people cannot distinguish permissible conduct from prohibited
conduct."'55 When life, liberty, or property is at stake, people must not be
forced to guess what statutes require of them.56 "A vague law
impermissibly delegates basic policy matters to policemen, judges, and
juries for resolution on an ad hoc and subjective basis."'57 The challenge
in Bykofsky focused on the wording of the ordinance's exceptions that
allowed minors to be out on the street for certain reasons during the
curfew hours.' Certain phrases, such as "reasonable necessity" and
1 Compare Waters v. Barry, 711 F. Supp. 1125 (D.D.C. 1989) (strict scrutiny test),
with City of Panora v. Simmons, 445 N.W.2d 363 (Iowa 1989) (rational basis test).
' See Waters, 711 F. Supp at 1138-39 (applying strict scrutiny to the curfew
ordinance); City of Milwaukee v. K.F., 426 N.W.2d 329 (Wis. 1988) (holding the curfew
ordinance constitutional after applying strict scrutiny).
1S3 See, e.g., People in the Interest of J.M., 768 P.2d 219, 223 (Colo. 1989)
(upholding the curfew ordinance after applying the rational basis test); Simmons, 445
N.W.2d at 369 (concluding that since neither a suspect class was involved, nor a fundamental
right encroached upon, the proper scrutiny by which to analyze the curfew ordinance was the
rational basis test).
1" See Scherr, supra note 148, at 191.
.55 Kevin C. Siebert, Note, Nocturnal Juvenile Curfew Ordinances: The Fifth
Circuit 'Warrowly Tailors"A Dallas Ordinance, But Will Similar Ordinances Encounter the
Same Interpretation, 73 WASH. U.L.Q. 1711, 1723 (1995).
15' See Bykofsky v. Borough of Middletown, 401 F. Supp. 1242, 1248 (M.D. Pa.
1975), affdmem., 535 F.2d 1245 (3d Cir. 1976) (citing Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451,
453 (1939)).
..
7 Id. (citing Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108-09 (1972)).
"ss Id. at 1249.
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"normal night-time activity" were phrases at issue here. 59 The court,
basing its decision on past usage of the phrase "reasonable necessity" held
that it was not vague.16 The court found that the term "normal" was
vague, as "[t]he curfew ordinance fails to set forth any guidelines as to
what is to be deemed 'normal' nighttime activity for minors. 061
In Allen, there were many words and phrases challenged for their
vagueness. 62 The court deemed words and phrases such as "reasonable
judgment", "upon an emergency errand", or "upon legitimate business"'163
vague." 4 These words and phrases, in their contextual setting, are
subjective and give those in charge of enforcing the curfew a great deal of
leeway. '65
III. PARENTAL RIGHTS AND JUVENILE CURFEWS
A. Constitutional Rights of Parents
"[C]onstitutional interpretation has consistently recognized that the
parents' claim to authority in their own household to direct the rearing of
their children is basic in the structure of our society."'" Accordingly, the
Courts have safeguarded parental rights from state interference when
concerning the upbringing of their children.'67
"' Id. at 1249-50.
'"Id. at 1249.
"'Bykofsky, 401 F. Supp. at 1250.
162 524 A.2d 478 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1987).
'"Id. at 481-82.
16 Id. at 482 (stating that "[o]ther provisions in the Bordentown ordinance are
equally vague and equally destructive to its validity.").
'6"Id. at 481.
'"See Trollinger, supra note 18, at 997 (discussing parents' rights with respect to their
children).
167 See, e.g., Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 400 (1923) (stating that parents
have the right and duty to determine what is suitable for their children to learn); Pierce v.
Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925) (stating that parents have the freedom to
direct their childrens' upbringing, including their education); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S.
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In Meyer v. Nebraska, 8 the Court found that a state could not
interfere with parents' constitutional right to decide matters concerning
their children's upbringing. 169  The Court held that the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution guaranteed citizens certain
rights: 170
Without doubt, it denotes not merely freedom from bodily
restraint but also the right of the individual to contract, to
engage in any of the common occupations of life, to
acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and
bring up children, to worship God according to the
dictates of his own conscience, and generally to enjoy
those privileges long recognized at common law as
essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free
men. 171
In Wisconsin v. Yoder,"7 the Court held that the constitutional
rights of Amish parents to direct the religious upbringing of their children
outweighed the state's interest in having the children attend school until
they reached sixteen years of age."7 The Court believed that regardless of
the significance of the State's interest in compulsory education, that
205, 215 (1972) (positing that the state does not have absolute authority in enforcing
compulsory education laws because the state's interest and the parents' interest must be
balanced); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 658 (1972) (stating that, contrary to the Illinois
statute which unconditionally denied unwed fathers the right to have custody of their
children, "all Illinois parents are constitutionally entitled to a hearing on their fitness before
their children are removed from their custody.").
262 U.S. 390 (1923).
169 Id. at 399 (dealing with the prohibition of teaching a foreign language to any
child who has not successfully passed eighth grade).
170 Id.
171 Id.
172 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
'73 Yoder, 406 U.S. at 212-13 (dealing with the violation of Wisconsin's compulsory
school-attendance policy by Amish families whose children were not sent to school but were
trained by their families to prepare them for their future in the Amish community).
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interest did not automatically outweigh other interests, especially,
legitimate free exercise claims. 174 The Court believed that courts must
carefully weigh all competing interests before rendering a decision when
a religious claim requiring exemption from a state ordered activity is at
stake.'75 Accordingly, because of the importance of the Religion Clauses,
the Court does not favor State legislation that has the possibility of a broad
application with unpredictable results. 1
76
In Stanley v. Illinois,177 the Court held that according to the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the petitioner, an unwed
father, had the right to a hearing to demonstrate his capability as a parent
and overcome the State's presumption that an unwed father was not fit to
raise his child on his own. 7 ' "The State's interest ... is de minimis if
Stanley is shown to be a fit father. It insists on presuming rather than
proving Stanley's unfitness [for convenience] .... Under the Due Process
Clause that advantage is insufficient . . . when the issue ...is the
dismemberment of his family.""' The Court demonstrates its consistent
preservation of the family unit by its past decisions. 8° Therefore, to
preserve the family unit, the Court would likely recognize parents' right to
set curfews for their own children.
In Pierce v. Society of Sisters,' the Court held that parents had
a constitutional right to send their children to private schools and that the
1
74 Id. at 215.
175 Id. at 235.
176 Id. at 234.
177 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
178 Id. (dealing with an Illinois statute giving the State custody of the children of
unmarried fathers after the deaths of their mothers).
1
79 Id. at 657-58.
ISo See, e.g., Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (stating that the right
to raise ones own children is fundamental); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942)
(stating that there are "basic civil rights" that all persons are afforded); May v. Anderson,
345 U.S. 528, 533 (1953) (stating that there are "[r]ights far more precious ... than property
rights.").
18 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
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State of Oregon's Compulsory Education Act violated this right."2 If there
is no sound relation to a legitimate state power, state legislation may not
limit constitutionally guaranteed rights.'83 The Court found that the state
does not have absolute control over children, with respect to mandating
that they receive their education from a particular source.'84 In
invalidating this ordinance, the Court stated, "[t]he child is not the mere
creature of the State; those who nurture him and direct his destiny have the
right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare him for
additional obligations."'85 This phrase, if applied to a discussion of
juvenile curfews, points towards the conclusion that the Court would
recognize that parents have the right to set and enforce curfews for their
own children without being forced to follow state guidelines.
Although the Court has upheld parents' right to direct their
childrens' upbringing, this right is not absolute.'86 When dealing with
legitimate state concerns, specifically those affecting the welfare of
children and the general public, the state may lawfully act to protect those
interests.'87 In Prince v. Massachusetts,' the Court spoke of the state's
broad powers in the context of limiting parental liberty.189 However, the
Court said that "[i]t is cardinal with us that the custody, care and nurture
of the child reside first in the parents, whose primary function and freedom
include preparation for obligations the state can neither supply nor
"2 Id. (concerning an Oregon act requiring all normal children to attend public
schools).
' Id. at 535.
184id.
185 Id.
"8 See Bykofsky v. Borough of Middletown, 401 F. Supp. 1242, 1262 (M.D. Pa.
1975), affldmem., 535 F.2d 1245 (3d Cir. 1976).
17/id.
188 321 U.S. 158 (1944) (dealing with a Massachusetts statute prohibiting anyone
from giving minors any articles, in this case Jehovah's Witness brochures, that the minor
intends to unlawfully distribute).
89 Id. at 167 (stating that "the state has a wide range of power for limiting parental
freedom and authority in things affecting the child's welfare; and that this includes, to some
extent, matters of conscience and religious conviction.").
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hinder."" Once again, as in Pierce, applying this phrase in the context of
curfews, leads to the conclusion that the Court would uphold parental
child rearing rights and invalidate a curfew that infringed upon those
rights.
In the context of parental constitutional rights and juvenile curfew
ordinances, the courts have not been consistent in their decisions,
upholding some curfew ordinances' 9' and invalidating others.'92 The court
in Bykofsky, held that because of exceptions, specifically allowing children
to be out when accompanied by a parent, the curfew ordinance did not
interfere with parents' control over their children.193
In City ofPanora v. Simmons, 4 the Supreme Court of Iowa held
that Panora's curfew ordinance'95 did not infringe upon parents' rights in
the upbringing of their children because the city of Panora had an interest
'
90 Id. at 166.
191 See, e.g., Bykofsky, 401 F. Supp. at 1264 (upholding the curfew ordinance
because "the curfew ordinance does not impermissibly impinge on the parents' constitutional
right to direct the upbringing of their children."); City of Panora v. Simmons, 445 N.W.2d
363, 370 (Iowa 1989) (upholding the curfew ordinance because the city had a compelling
interest in protecting the children); City of Eastlake v. Ruggiero, 220 N.E.2d 126, 129 (Ohio
Ct. App. 1966) (upholding the validity of the parental responsibility portion of the curfew
ordinance because "[a] parent's rights in respect of the care and custody of his minor children
are subject to control and regulation by the state by appropriate legislative or judicial action.");
City of Milwaukee v. K.F., 426 N.W.2d 329, 339 (Wis. 1988) (citing Prince v. Massachusetts,
321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944)) (upholding the curfew ordinance because "while parental interests
in rearing children without state or municipal interference may be impinged upon by the
ordinance,... 'the state as parenspatriae may restrict the parent's control."').
92See, e.g., McCollester v. City of Keene, 586 F. Supp. 1381, 1386 (D.N.H. 1984)
(finding that the curfew ordinance interfered with parents' rights to raise and rear their
children); Allen v. Bordentown, 524 A.2d 478, 574 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1987) (finding
that the ordinance interferes with parents' rights to have their children exercise their
constitutional rights).
"
3 Bykofsky, 401 F. Supp. at 1264.
' 445 N.W.2d 363 (1989).
193 Id. at 364 (discussing the curfew in question, ordinance number 2.1-1.0301,
which prohibited anyone under 18 from remaining on any public street or place of business
between 10:00 p.m. and 5:00 a.m.).
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in protecting minors from the ills facing the city."' The court agreed with
Panora's argument that "while a right to family autonomy exists, such
rights are subject to the same limitations as other constitutionally protected
rights and that minors are subject to reasonable regulations imposed by
legislative authorities.""9 The court felt that Panora's curfew, in fact, gave
control to the parents and supported the family unit by advocating that
children stay at home. 98 The court based its decision on the fact that
Panora's ordinance only minimally encroached upon constitutional rights
while the city's interest in enacting the ordinance was profound."9 Here,
the court upheld the ordinance because the city's interest outweighed the
parent's interest.00
The Ohio Court of Appeals, in City of Eastlake v. Ruggiero,2"'
held that the curfew ordinance0 2 did not violate parents' constitutional
right to direct the upbringing of their children.20 3 The ordinance stated, in
pertinent part, that "'[i]t shall also be unlawful for any parent or guardian
of any child ... to allow such child to be upon the streets or sidewalks
during the period from darkness to dawn ... ,204 The court stated that the
terms of the ordinance applicable to the parents of curfew violators
required actual knowledge of the violation, and if the parents were lax in
supervising their children, the curfew's provisions were a constitutionally
196 Id. at 370 (stating that "the City has a strong interest in protecting minors from
the national epidemic of drugs, and the curfew ordinance is a minimal infringement upon a
parent's right to bring up his or her child.").
'97 Id. at 369.
'98 Id. at 370.
'99 Simmons, 445 N.W.2d at 370.
200 Id.
20 220 N.E.2d 126 (Ohio Ct. App. 1966).
202 Id. at 127 (discussing the curfew in question, Section 583.02 of the Codified
Ordinance of the City of Eastlake, which sets out different curfews for persons under 12 and
those between 12 and 16). Children under 12 are prohibited from being on the streets from
dark to dawn and those between 12 and 16 are prohibited from being on the streets from
midnight until 6:00 a.m. Id.
..
3 Id. at 129.
204 Id. at 127 (citing the ordinance at issue in this case).
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valid means of state supervision." 5
In City ofMilwaukee v. K., 206 the Supreme Court of Wisconsin
held that the curfew ordinance 7 did not interfere with a parent's rights
with respect to raising children.2"8 The court also said that the state has
broad latitude in terms of restricting the rights of parents when the welfare
of children is at stake.20 9
In McCollester v. City ofKeene,210 the United States District Court
of New Hampshire invalidated the Keene, New Hampshire curfew
ordinance211 saying that "the stated governmental objectives [were] not
sufficient to justify the ordinance's infringement of parents' privacy and
liberty interests., 21 2 The court also found that the ordinance improperly
encroached on parental privacy rights as well as parental freedomin family
life and child rearing.2"3 Accordingly, a statute or ordinance will be
invalidated when it unjustifiably intrudes upon parental rights. 214
InAllen v. Bordentown,2" the court stated that "[t]he Bordentown
2
. Id. at 129.
206 426 N.W.2d 329 (Wis. 1988).
207 Id. at 332 (discussing the ordinance in question, found in the Milwaukee Code
of Ordinances, section 106-23 which prohibited those under 17 from, among other things,
congregating and loitering on public streets and in public places between 11:00 p.m. and
5:00 a.m.).211 Id. at 339.
209 Id. (citing Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944)) (agreeing with
the United States Supreme Court's idea that "where 'acting to guard the general interest in
youth's well being, the state as parens patriae may restrict the parent's control ....
210 586 F. Supp. 1381 (D.N.H. 1984).
211 Id. at 1387-89 (discussing the ordinance in question, cited at N.H. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 31:43-a through N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 31:43-g (1980), amended in 1981 and
1982, which prohibited persons under 16 from being on a public street between 10:00 p.m.
and 5:00 a.m.).
21 Id. at 1386 (stating that "the ordinance restricts the parents' protected liberty
interests in family and child rearing by usurping parental discretion in supervising a child's
activities and imposing parental liability even where the parent exercised reasonable control
or supervision in authorizing a child's activities which violate the ordinance.").
2152 Id.
214 id.
211 524 A.2d 478 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1987).
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ordinance, by preventing children from exercising [their] fundamental
constitutional rights, interfere[d] with the right of parents to have their
children exercise those rights." '216 The court also stated that "[any law
supporting the parental role advances a strong state interest while one
which inhibits that role does the opposite." '217 The court, by its decision
here, preserved the sanctity of the family by protecting parental rights and
by not allowing the state to interfere with parental authority.2"'
B. Parents and Punishment'
According to the National Conference of State Legislatures,
approximately half the states have amended existing laws or created new
ones to apply to the parents of curfew violators.2" By holding parents
liable for their children's behavior, the legislatures are trying to increase
parental responsibility.220 Many curfew ordinances, in fact, contain
parental liability provisions.' For example, in Dallas, "[y]ouths and their
parents, at the court's discretion, can be fined as much as $500 or ordered
to perform community service, like cleaning up graffiti." '222 In New
Orleans, "[p]arents are required to pick up their children [at the Central
Curfew Center] and take part in counseling with a trained staff of religious
216 Id. at 487. The court continued by stating "[n]early all parents in this country
want their children to understand, uphold and use their rights of free speech, assembly,
religion and travel. The ordinance impermissibly restricts the right of parents to have their
children do so." Id.
217 id.
218 Id.
219 Peter Applebome, Parents Face Consequences As Children's Misdeeds Rise,
N.Y. TiMES, Apr. 10, 1996, at Al (also stating that "[i]n 1995 alone, at least 10 states from
New Hampshire to Louisiana to Oregon passed so-called parental responsibility laws calling
for fines or sometimes imprisonment.").
220 See Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. Davis, 368 N.E.2d 336, 337-38 (Ohio 1977)
(stating that one reason for enacting parental liability laws was to increase parental supervision
over children).
221 See, e.g., infra notes 219-241 and accompanying text.
222 See Butterfield, supra note 13, at Al.
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and psychiatric volunteers." '223 The New Orleans curfew also imposes a
monetary penalty on the parents of repeat offenders.224
Other cities, states, and countries impose penalties on parents of
children who violate curfew ordinances.225 The penalties vary, as some
impose warnings,226 others impose community service,227 and still others
impose monetary fines."8 For example, in Buffalo, New York, "[p]arents
of first-time violators will receive a warning, while parents of repeat
offenders will face fines of up to $200. ' ' 229 Buffalo's mayor, James A.
McGinnis, proposed stiffer penalties for parents of offenders.23° Under the
proposed plan, "[v]iolations could subject the parents or guardian to a fine
of up to $250 or 15 days in jail, or both."23' In the Town of Tonawanda,
near Buffalo, New York, Town Supervisor Carl J. Calabrese proposed that
"'irresponsible parents' should be forced to pay hefty fines.232
In Mechanicville, New York, although a curfew was enacted in
223 Id.
224 Id. "Parents of repeat offenders are issued a court summons and may be fined
as much as $500." Id.
22 See infra notes 226-244 and accompanying text (stating the different penalties
imposed on curfew violators and their parents).
226 See Phil Fairbanks, ACLU Plans Suit Against Teen Curfew; City Group Will
Monitor How Police Enforce Law, BuFF. NEWS, June 8, 1994, at I (stating that "[p]arents
of first-time violators will receive a warning.").
227 See, e.g., Tim O'Brien, Police, Parents and Teens Ready For Troy Curfew,
TiMEs UNION (Albany, NY), Sept. 15, 1996, at D3 (stating that parents of second time
curfew violators could be fined and forced to perform twenty five hours of community
service); King, supra note 28, at B5 (stating that parents of curfew violators in New Jersey
could face fines of as much as $1,000 or court-ordered community service).
'See, e.g., O'Brien, supra note 227, at D3; King, supra note 28, at B5 (discussing
monetary penalties for parents of curfew violators).229 See Fairbanks, supra note 226, at 1.
230 See Richard Batzer, Officer Gives Support To Youth Curfew, BUFF. NEWS, Nov.
28,1995, atB4.
231 Id.
232See Niki Cervantes, Town Might Fine 'Irresponsible Parents': Tonawanda Eyes
Alternative to Curfew For Troublesome Youngsters, BuFF. NEws, Aug. 31, 1995, at B8.
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1915, it appears that it has never been enforced.233 In accordance with the
Mechanicville curfew, "youths who violate the curfew face no sanction at
all." The Mechanicville ordinance calls for the arrest of parents who do
not know their childrens' whereabouts during the curfew hours.235
Norman Siegel, executive director of The New York Civil Liberties Union
stated, "'Under no circumstances should you punish the parents for the
actions of a juvenile, unless you can demonstrate a clear contributory
fault. ,236
Many communities often impose harsher penalties for curfew
violators.2 37  Teenage curfew violators in California cities, such as
Thousand Oaks or Fillmore, face fines or losing their driving privileges,
while the parents of curfew violators face fines of up to $2,500.238 In
Ventura County, "[flirst-time violators and their parents ... have always
attended a 45-minute class on the consequences of petty crime ....
Second-timers are ordered to contribute $25 to charity ....,,239 In Simi
Valley, California, in addition to being fined up to $2,500, parents of
curfew violators also face the possibility of having to pay for the time that
the police spend apprehending their children.24°
In November 1995, the District of Columbia's Prince George
233 See Sam Howe Verhovek, It's 10 P.M, Parents; How Do You Plead?, N.Y
TIMEs, Apr. 20, 1990, at BI (stating that "[t]he Mayor, dusting off a 1915 ordinance that
seems to have never been enforced, is vowing to clamp down on any parent whose child is
found out and about after 10 p.m.").
23
4 id.
235 Id.
236 Id. In essence, according to Mr. Siegel, "[tihat means a parent would actually
have to encourage a child to break the curfew, and even then the law would be suspect ....
[aind if a youth sneaks out a window late one night? 'Forget it' ... '[t]he law could never
stand up in court."' Id.
237 See Mack Reed, New Laws Clip Wings of Teenage Nighthawks; Curfew:
Violations Can Now Mean Loss of Driver's Licenses For Teens and Fines For Parents.
Police Say Regulations Are For the Youngsters' Safety, L.A. TIMEs, May 27, 1996, at BI
(citing the different counties' attitudes towards curfews).
2 38 Id.
239 id.
240 id.
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County enacted ajuvenile curfew.241 Children who violate Prince George
County's curfew ordinance receive a written warning and are sent home.242
Prince George's ordinance imposes penalties on parents and businesses
who allow juveniles to violate the curfew.243 Both the parents of repeat
offenders and the businesses where youths have violated the curfew face
fines.24
IV. PROBLEMS WITH ENFORCING JUVENILE CURFEWS
A. Who Will Abide By the Curfews?
There are many problems that confront those faced with enforcing
curfews. James Allen Fox, Dean of Northeastern University's College of
Criminal Justice said, "'Curfews are a quick and easy fix, but not
necessarily effective' .... The problem with curfew laws is that most kids,
the good, the bad and the tired, are asleep at midnight ....,245 Pamela
Katz of the New York Civil Liberties Union, feels that curfews are
ineffective:
[a]nd logic dictates that we assume young people running
drugs who are not deterred by the harsh anti-drug laws
and the sentences they carry, will not be hindered by
curfew laws that require violators to go to a holding
station until their parents or guardians retrieve them or, at
worst, to pay a fine for which their parents will be
141 See Philip P. Pan, Prince George's Police Begin to Enforce Juvenile Curfew,
WASH. POST, July 2, 1996, at BI (referring to the curfew, which applies to those under 17,
and was in effect from 10:00 p.m. until 5:00 a.m. on weeknights and midnight on weekends).
242 Id.
243 Id.
' Id. (stating that parents are fined $50, $100, and $250, while the businesses are
fined up to $500).
s See Butterfield, supra note 13, at Al.
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responsible. "
Additionally, Newark store owner, Norberto Otero said, "[t]he kids simply
ignore the curfew, and the police are too busy to do much about it....
'The people ruining the city aren't affected by the curfew."' 247
Minors who are affected by curfews are vocal on the subject.24
One said that the curfews only work for the short time when the police are
actually there chasing the minors off the streets, but once they leave, the
minors often return.249 Another said that a curfew might have been
successful in the past, but that "'now the kids will just laugh in their face.
... To the kids out on the streets now, it's become a way of life and there's
no way the police can make any significant impact, youth curfew or
not.'
250
Students at Henry Grady High School in Atlanta, Georgia had
mixed reactions to the idea of a curfew.25' One fourteen-year-old student
said that the curfew would not have any impact on crime because those
who commit the crimes will commit them despite the curfew.252 A fifteen-
year-old student questioned the reasons for applying Atlanta's curfew to
those under seventeen, because he did not see a difference between a
sixteen-year-old and a seventeen-year-old. 253 Another fifteen- year-old
student, however, liked the idea of the curfew because she said that it
would supplement the guidelines that her parents had set for her.254
246 See Katz, supra note 20, at E2 (showing her opposition to juvenile curfews as
well as their inability to deter crime because those that commit crimes would not be deterred
by curfew ordinances where minimal penalties are imposed).
7 See Neela Banerjee, Curfews Spread, But Effects Are Still Not Clear, WALL ST.
J., Mar. 4, 1994, atB1.
248 See infra notes 249-254.
249 See Banejee, supra note 247, at B1.
2so See Richard Weizel, Street Violence and Teen-Age Curfews, N.Y. TIMEs, June
19, 1994, at § 14CN, at 1.
211 See infra notes 252-254.
22 See Smothers, supra note 28, at Al.
253 id.
254 Id.
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B. Sufficiency of the Police Department to Enforce the Curfews
Another problem involving the enforcement of curfews is the lack
of police power and resources needed to effectively enforce them.255
According to Chris Hansen, senior staff counsel for the American Civil
Liberties Union, cities often fail to enforce the curfews because "'they take
a massive amount of police time and effort for very little payoff.'m256 In
1996, William Miller, the police chief of Troy, New York, declared
"curfews as unnecessary and difficult to enforce."217 In 1994, another
chief of police, John A. Dale, of Albany, stated that "[curfews] 'place an
undue burden on the department to enforce something that basically would
be unenforceable ... [and they are] of no benefit to the citizens or the
Police Department."'258
In the summer of 1995, the District of Columbia adopted a
juvenile curfew. 259 According to police officials, however, "the city's
officers [were] too busy with emergency calls to vigorously enforce [the
curfew]. 2' In fact, even though only one curfew violator was picked up
each night during the first three months of the curfew's existence, none of
those violators was charged.261
Long Island, New York, does not currently have any juvenile
curfew ordinances and the local officials want it to stay that way.262
According to Don Longo, Suffolk County Police Sgt., "'I think [curfews]
would be a nightmare.... You would need an army of police officers to
enforce it ... and you could end up with three-hundred-fifty kids down
25 See infra notes 256-271 and accompanying text.
256 Butterfield, supra note 13, at Al.
2 7 See Katz, supra note 20, at E2.
258 Id.
259 See Pan, supra note 241, at BI and accompanying text.
260 Id.
261 id.
262 See Justin Martin, Inside Long Island: Curfews for Kids; Many Say It's Just Not
Time, NEWSDAY (Nassau/Suffolk), July 23, 1995, at A8. See also infra note 263 and
accompanying text.
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here at the precinct."'263
The Town of Tonawanda, New York, tried to come up with an
alternative to juvenile curfews by attempting to fine "'irresponsible
parents' for their childrens' misdeeds.2" Tonawanda's officials are
opposed to imposing a juvenile curfew because they feel "a curfew could
end up slowing police response to other calls for assistance and would
require a new detention center to handle violators."265
In Connecticut, curfews are in effect in several communities such
as Bridgeport, Hartford, New London, and New Britain.266 Although
those curfews find political support, police officials are wary of the
curfew's effectiveness, or with concerns as to whether the police
departments are sufficiently equipped to enforce the curfews.267 A
Hartford police officer said, "'I don't see [the curfew] being used at all..
. . We just don't have the manpower to enforce it."'268 In fact, Mary
Moran, the mayor at the time when Bridgeport's curfew ordinance was
originally proposed, voted against the curfew "at the urging of Police
Chief, Thomas Sweeney," who felt that the curfew was unmanageable and
unenforceable. 269  According to William Gavitt, New London Police
Captain, "'[The new curfew] could bog down the system.' 270 Acting
Police Chief of New Britain, Edwin Mercier said that "'[tihere is not a
whole lot of teeth in the law, but we don't have the manpower to enforce
it on a daily basis anyway. Frankly, we're not sure when and how we're
going to use it. ''i271
263 Id.
" See Cervantes, supra note 232, at B8.
26S Id.
266 See Weizel, supra note 250, at 1.
267 Id. "Around the state the concept is supported by many politicians and most
of the business community, but opposed by some law enforcement officials and many teen-agers
[sic] themselves." Id.
268 Id.
269 Id.
271 See Weizel, supra note 250, at 1.
271 Id.
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C. Selective Enforcement and Discrimination
Another problem with enforcing juvenile curfews is the possibility
of selective enforcement,2" which would often be caused by and result in
discrimination against minorities.273 This problem was anticipated in
Buffalo by Council Majority Leader Eugene M. Fahey, who decided to
hold meetings between the police officials and community leaders to
discuss how the police would enforce the curfew and to allay the
community fears about selective enforcement.274
The idea of discrimination in juvenile curfew enforcement troubles
many.275 At a hearing discussing juvenile curfews in Troy, New York, it
was said:
'Nobody's going to tell me that [a] police officer going
down Pawling Avenue is going to stop every kid who is 10
minutes past curfew, but that [a] police officer in the inner
city who sees a kid with his pants hanging low and... his
hat tipped sideways is going to be a prime target .. 276
A study done to determine the effects of juvenile curfews in
selected cities, concluded that "curfew restrictions are disproportionately
enforced in minority communities and against individuals perceived as
'different' from the norm."277 The American Civil Liberties Union also
voiced their worries about possible discriminatory enforcement of juvenile
272 See Smothers, supra note 28, at Al.
273 See, e.g., Ashton v. Brown, 660 A.2d 447, 452-53 (Md. 1995) (stating that the
police set up a curfew sweep at a restaurant regularly patronized by African-Americans).
274 See Dale Anderson & Harold McNeil, Griffin Signs Law On Curfew; Curb on
Young to Begin Jan. 1, BUFF. NEws, Dec. 6, 1993.
271 See Fairbanks, supra note 226, at Al (stating that the ACLU feared the police
would target the African-American and Hispanic communities).
276 Katz, supra note 20, at E2.
277 Id. (discussing the survey analyzing curfews in San Francisco, Oakland, and
New Orleans, by a policy institute, the Center on Juvenile and Criminal Justice).
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curfews. 278
This fear of discrimination and selective enforcement, many feel,
can create more problems in the community because of already increased
tensions between minorities and the police in many United States cities .279
In fact, these fears are well-founded. 2" Lieutenant Louis Wolf of the
Hartford Police Department stated that, "'[b]ecause of increased gang
violence and drive-by shootings, we felt we had to do something, and I
think the curfew has helped .... We mostly target areas ravaged by drugs
and prostitution. We don't bother a kid coming home from the movies.' 211
Discriminatory enforcement simply serves to undermine the curfew and
its purposes by applying the curfew to certain groups of youths and
punishing them, and not trying to protect all youths as they purport to do.
When Atlanta enacted its curfew in 1990, the Georgia chapter of
the American Civil Liberties Union spoke harshly about the curfew.2 2
Ellen Spears, the group's interim director, said that "the curfew would
unfairly focus on the city's poor neighborhoods, which are predominantly
black. t1283
InAshton v. Brown,2" the Mayor and Police Chief, Major Ashton,
planned a curfew sweep at a restaurant that was frequented by
predominantly African-Americans residing in Frederick County,
Maryland.285 Twenty-eight suspected curfew violators were apprehended
at the restaurant,286 however, there is a discrepancy as to the actual number
27 See Fairbanks, supra note 226, at A].
279 See Geoffrey Canada, Curfews Are for Parents to Set, N.Y. TIMEs, July 23,
1996, at Al9.
280 See Weizel, supra note 250, at I (stating that the police often target certain
neighborhoods looking for curfew violators); see also C. Virginia Fields, A Curfew for the
City's Kids? It Will Mask Real Problems, DAIhY NEWS (New York), Jan 16, 1997, at 41
(stating her concerns based upon "the disproportionate targeting of black and Latino youth
by police, which already occurs without benefit of a curfew law").
281 Weizel, supra note 250, at 1.
282 Smothers, supra note 28, at Al.
283 Id.
284 660 A.2d 447 (Md. 1995).
285 Id. at 452-53.
286 Id. at 453.
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of patrons who were in fact detained.2"7 The plaintiffs introduced
statistical evidence supporting their claim of racial discrimination.2"'
Although discrimination was argued in the brief submitted to the court,
neither the trial court nor the intermediate court addressed the racial
discrimination claim.2 89
Selective enforcement not only deals with racial discrimination, it
also deals with situations where police officers have the discretion to either
stop suspected violators or let them go.29° Prince George County in the
District of Columbia is made up of many different suburban communities,
which creates difficulty in enforcing the curfew because juveniles are
widely dispersed throughout the county.291 Accordingly, the police have
their own way of enforcing the curfew.292 Tony Ayers of the Prince
George County police department, stated that "'[y]ou don't want to waste
a lot of time searching for loiterers, so we target the areas where there are
a lot of complaints.""'29 This selective enforcement subjects only those in
the targeted areas to the curfew's restrictions.294
Additionally, U.S. District Judge Joseph McKinley, invalidated a
juvenile curfew ordinance in Henderson, Kentucky.295 He had a problem
with the fact that it was "susceptible to [the] moment-to moment opinion
2.7 Id. (plaintiffs claim all twenty-eight violators that were detained were African-
American, while defendants claim that twenty-five of the twenty-eight violators were
African-American).
2nId. at 453 n.5.
2 9Ashton, 660 A.2d at 454.
29 See Trollinger, supra note 18, at 1002 (stating that because it is not possible for
those in charge of enforcing the curfews to stop everyone who is possibly in violation of the
curfew, there is great potential for selective enforcement).
"See Susan Saulny, All's Quiet Under the Prince George's Curfew; Teens Mostly
Resigned to New Rule; Parents, Business Owners Back It, WASH. POST, Aug. 18, 1996, at
H1.
292 id.
293 Id.
2 See supra text accompanying notes 272-293.
29 See John Lucas, Kentucky City's Curfew Tossed Out: Court Rules Ordinance
Apptying to Juveniles Too Vague; Authorities UndecidedAboutAppeal, ROCKY MTN. NEws,
July 21, 1996, at 38A.
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of a policeman on his beat and to arbitrary and discriminatory
enforcement."296
D. Are Nocturnal Juvenile Curfews the Solution to the Juvenile Crime
Problem?
On October 29, 1996, the District of Columbia's District Court
invalidated the District of Columbia's juvenile curfew ordinance in
Hutchins v. District of Columbia.297 A problem that Judge Emmet G.
Sullivan29 had with that ordinance was that the District's statistical
evidence did not support the District Council's assertions that youths
commit more crimes or are victims of more crimes during the curfew
hours.' In support of this idea, Harry L. Shorstein, Jacksonville Florida's
State Attorney, said that "'we know that most crimes occur during school
hours as a result of truancy or after school gets out and before dinner
time."" Others, skeptical of the curfews, say that the majority ofjuvenile
crime occurs during school hours, the afternoon and early evening.'
Additionally, "[m]any criminologists say curfews just shift juvenile crime
to earlier in the day."3' If the criminologists are correct and juvenile crime
merely shifts, the main purpose in enacting curfews is defeated.
V. CAN A JUVENILE CURFEW SUCCEED IN NEW YORK CITY?
Council minority leader, Thomas Ognibene, has proposed a
296 Id.
z 942 F. Supp. 665 (D.D.C. 1996).
29 Judge Emmet G. Sullivan, a District Judge for the United States District Court
for the District of Columbia, wrote the opinion in Hutchins. See id. at 665-66.
29See Locy, supra note 28, at Al.
30 See Butterfield, supra note 13, at Al.
301 See Derrick Jackson, Curfews Are Poor Answer to Teen Crime, DALLAS
MORNING NEws, June 11, 1996, at 17A.
302 Curfews Should Be Local Matter, MORNING CALL (Allentown), June 4, 1996,
atAl4.
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juvenile curfew ordinance for New York City, similar to others that are
currently in effect in many cities in the United States.3"3 He professes that
the curfew would "reduce graffiti, car theft and vandalism."3" Mayor
Rudolph Giuliani has agreed to consider enacting the curfew, despite the
possibility of problems.3"5
Local community boards would have the ultimate decision as to
whether or not their community would enforce the curfew.30 6 Originally,
Ognibene planned for the curfew ordinance to apply to juveniles under the
age of eighteen, and would be in effect after 10:00 p.m. on Sunday
through Thursday, and 11:00 p.m. on Friday and Saturday.30 7 City Council
Minority Leader, Thomas V. "Ognibene's [revised] proposal, aimed at
cutting juvenile crime, would force kids under 18 to be off city streets
after midnight during the school year and after 12:30 a.m. during the
summer."3'0 There has been no determination as to the time the curfew
would end.3' The bill would provide exemptions for those going to or
returning from work, sporting events, religious or school events, or
recreational activities.3 0 Youth violators would perform twenty-five hours
of community service for a first offense and fifty hours for each additional
offense.' Parents of youth violators would receive fines of seventy five
dollars for the first offense and $250 for each additional offense.3 12
3
"
3See Michael 0. Allen & Don Gentile, Council Mulling Curfew On Teens, DAILY
NEws (New York), July 10, 1996, at 3.
"' See Rudy Cool To Curfew Bill, NEWSDAY(Nassau & Suffolk), July 11, 1996,
at A26.
30 Id. (quoting Mayor Giuliani who stated that "'[t]here are complications to it in
a city like New York, in any large city. Legal Complications. Practical complications.'").
3
"See Allen & Gentile, supra note 303, at 3.
The council struck down this plan in 1996. See Joel Siegel, Pole Eyes a Curfew
For Teens, DAILY NEWS (New York), July 2, 1997, at 24.
308 Id. "Kids hanging out on their stoops or on sidewalks next to their homes could
stay outside until I a.m." Id.
309 See Joseph W. Queen & William Murphy, Teen Curfew Proposed for City,
NEWSDAY (Queens), July 10, 1996, at A3.
310 id.
... See Allen & Gentile, supra note 303, at 3.
312id.
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There are mixed reactions to the curfew throughout the city."'
For example, Council Speaker Peter Vallone is against the curfew because
he feels "there are many worthwhile activities at night for youths."3"4 He
also spoke of the recent drop in crime thereby eliminating the need to
enact a curfew. 5 In addition, Police Department spokeswoman, Marilyn
Mode, stated three problems that she found with the idea of imposing a
curfew in New York City. 6 She said it "'would penalize good youths,
would be difficult to enforce and [would be] an added burden for street
cops."'317 President Clinton, however, totally supports the idea of a
curfew. '8 On the other hand, it is not surprising that most teenagers in the
New York City area are not happy with the idea of imposing a curfew.319
Looking at the proposed curfew in light of the discussion in Part
IV of this paper,3 it would seem that a curfew for New York City would
not be successful. There are many possible problems with enacting a
curfew in New York City. First, minors can easily obtain fake
identification cards,32 which when shown to police officers, would
absolve them of liability, unless the police officer realized the
identification was fake. Second, as mentioned in Part IV,322 there is
already a great deal of racial tension between the police and many minority
See infra notes 314-319 and accompanying text.
s'4 Allen and Gentile, supra note 303, at 3
See Rudy Cool to Curfew Bill, supra note 304, at A26.
316 See Allen & Gentile, supra note 303, at 3. See also infra text accompanying
note 317.
317 Id.
318 
Id.
319 Id. ("While some teens said a curfew would keep a lot of kids out of trouble,
most gave it a thumbs down.").
... See discussion supra Part IV.
321 See Christine B. Whelan, Psst! Here's What Party Girls Are Really Like, N.Y.
TIMEs, Sept. 15, 1996, § 1, at 53 (discussing the ease with which minors can obtain fake ID,
especially fake Texas driver's licenses). See also Wyllys Chip Terry, Editorial, Those
'Objective' Tests StillBenefit the Rich, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 1, 1996, at A34 (discussing the ease
in obtaining fake IlYs, in the context of fake ID's used by people fraudulently taking standardized
exams for others).322 See discussion supra Part IV.
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groups in New York City.323 In New York City, there are many cases
where the police have abused their authority in African-American and
Latino communities. 24 Enacting a curfew, especially if it is enforced in a
discriminatory manner, will do more harm than good. 25 With the city's
rising racial tension, enacting and enforcing a curfew might exacerbate the
already hostile situation. 2 6 Third, New York City is a large city that is
constantly facing budget cuts.327 In fact, Mayor Giuliani planned to cut the
New York City's Police Department's budget by approximately 42 million
dollars.328 Clearly, budget cuts to the Police Department would hamper
efforts to enforce a juvenile curfew by decreasing the size of the police
force. Fourth, New York City has had success with its current truancy
program.329 Former police commissioner, William Bratton, said, "'It was
323 See James J. Green, What a Police Force Should Look Like, N.Y. TImEs, Dec.
26, 1993, § 13LI, at 15 (stating that "[i]t is extremely difficult for members of an
underrepresented group to view the police as being responsive to their needs, free of prejudice
and interested in the cause ofjustice if they do not see members of their group on the force.");
see also Canada, supra note 279, atAl9 (stating that "[i]f you are a person of color and fare]
male, you invariably have a story to tell about police harassment or worse."). "In New York
City, police abuse in their [African-American and Latino] neighborhoods includes the use of
excessive force and the death of suspects in custody, according to an Amnesty International
report." Id.324 See Canada, supra note 279, at Al 9.
325 Id. (stating that because of the tensions already present in minority communities
between the residents and the police, the possibility of selective enforcement may worsen
the problem).
3 2 6 Id.
327 See Steven Lee Myers, Giuliani Weighs Reducing Police Force By 1,000 Jobs;
Considers Plans to Close $2 Billion Budget Gap, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 25, 1996, at Al (stating
that "the Mayor ha[d] ordered each of his agencies to cut their budgets for the next fiscal
year by 7.5 percent .... ").
311 See Clifford J. Levy, Giuliani Budget To Spend Millions On Trailers For
Crowded Schools, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 31, 1997, at Al (stating that while Mayor Giuliani
expects to cut the amount of money allocated to the New York City Police Department, it
is hoped that there will not be a change in the size of the police force).
329 See Teen Curfew Success Reported, But Doubts Persist, OMAHA WORLD
HERALD, June 3, 1996, at 1 (stating that "[i]n New York City, which has had a 30 percent
drop in juvenile crime in the past three years, the decision against a curfew was deliberate
.... .).
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felt we could get a bigger bang for the buck with a truancy program.'m330
Finally, New York City's size will also present an enforcement problem.331
If a curfew cannot succeed in a small city, how can it succeed in New
York City? According to C. Virginia Fields, former Manhattan Council
member and new Manhattan Borough President, a curfew can't succeed
in New York City.332
VI. CONCLUSION
Juvenile curfews, although in effect for many years, are not
without problems. Constitutional challenges are frequently brought to
enjoin enforcement of the curfews.3 33 Among the many challenges to
these curfews are that they infringe upon the constitutional rights of minors
and their parents. 33 "A few state and federal courts have considered their
validity but no case has reached the United States Supreme Court."335
Without clear guidance from the United States Supreme Court, there will
not be a universally held standard on this issue, as each court dealing with
a curfew challenge will continue to decide the case absent a clear standard
to follow. 336 Consequently, the confusion that currently exists among the
different state and federal courts will not be cleared up, and the stream of
330 Id.
... See Laura Vecsey, Brotherly Dispute For Mayor, Alderman Signoracci's Split
On Cohoes Youth Curfew, TnMms UNION, Aug. 10, 1990, at B3 (discussing the possibility of
enacting a curfew in Cohoes). Cohoes Mayor Robert Signoracci said, "'This is not to say Im
opposed to the idea of a curfew, but you have to look at demographics and location."' Id.
332 See Fields, supra note 280, at 41 (stating that "[a] juvenile curfew for New York
City is untimely and ill-advised, as it serves only to mask problems, not address them.").
... See, e.g., Hutchins v. District of Columbia, 942 F. Supp. 665 (D.D.C. 1996);
Ashton v. Brown, 660 A.2d 447 (Md. 1995); Qutb v. Strauss, 11 F.3d 488 (5th Cir. 1993).
'3"See Trollinger, supra note 18, at 977 (stating that juvenile curfews penalize minors
and their parents for acting within their constitutional rights).33 Allen v. City of Bordentown, 524 A.2d 478, 480 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1987).
336 See Williams, supra note 140, at 476 (stating that "[c]ourts have inconsistently
applied three different equal protection approaches [rational basis, strict scrutiny, and the Bellotti
test] when analyzing juvenile curfews.")
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inconsistent results will continue.13 7
Curfews are also plagued with problems from a non-legal
standpoint. For example, if children are kept off the streets to avoid
becoming victims of crime, what about the elderly or the mentally ill?
Shouldn't they should be afforded the same protections as children? Using
this rationale, curfews simply cannot be justified. Curfews by virtue of
their flaws, seem to be more of an excuse to regulate childrens' behavior,
and not to achieve the goals they set out to achieve.
Jill A. Lichtenbaum
117 Compare Bykofsky v. Borough of Middletown, 401 F. Supp. 1242 (M.D. Pa.
1975),affdmem., 535 F.2d 1245 (3d Cir. 1976); In re Juan C., 33 Cal. Rptr.2d 919 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1994); People in the Interest of J.M., 768 P.2d 219 (Colo. 1989) with Hutchins v. District
of Columbia, 942 F. Supp. 665 (D.D.C. 1996); Ashton v. Brown, 660 A.2d 447 (Md. 1995);
Waters v. Barry, 711 F. Supp. 1125 (D.D.C. 1989); Allen, 524 A.2d at 478.
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